Introduction
Th e events of early autumn 1934 did not foreshadow any changes in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. As a result of a coup carried out six years earlier in January 1929, 1 the eff ective power in the country was in the hands of King Alexander I of the House of Karađorđević. His model of government could be described as authoritarian, although King Alexander I did try to maintain a semblance of democracy. Th e monarch had indeed implemented an administrative reform in October 1929, then decreed a new constitution in September 1931; in the very same year, he called a parliamentary election, having fi rst restored the previously suspended parliament. For the upcoming years, King Alexander I had envisaged a gradual thawing of his dictatorship and the restoration of full democracy in the country, but, by October 1934, these promises have not been fulfi lled.
It should be noted, however, that the harshness of his rule coincided with the improvement of the country's situation in the international scene. Despite a dispute with Italy ruled by Benito Mussolini, Yugoslavia strengthened its position by means of alliances in Central Europe and the Balkans -with Czechoslovakia, Romania, Greece and Turkey (as part of the so-called Little Entente and Balkan Entente). Friendly relations were also cultivated with France. As a result, King Alexander I would be far more concerned by the fi ssiparous tendencies in the country, especially among the Croats who resorted to political or terrorist methods in their demands of autonomy or complete independence from the Yugoslav kingdom.
Alexander I wished to settle the issue of Croatian separatism by seeking compromise with the political leader of the Croats, Vladko Maček, heir to the tradition of the Croatian Peasant Party, who remained incarcerated since April 1933 on charges of anti-state activities. Th e king, however, would not reveal the details of his planned reconciliation with Maček, and his hopes for a peaceful settlement of the internal dispute in Yugoslavia were cut short by his assassination on 9 October 1934 during his stay in France. Following his death, the concept of the Yugoslavian state implemented by the House of Karađorđević has de facto collapsed, and the country plunged into chaos. For this reason, the circumstances of the murder of King Alexander I constitute an interesting subject, although not oft en discussed -especially in Polish and non-Balkan scholarly literature.
Th erefore, the aim of the present article is to examine the course of the assault that brought the demise of King Alexander I, as well as to defi ne the circumstances and early consequences of this event, among which particular attention should be paid to the characteristic of the assassin, the premises of the international investigation, and fi nally, the internal situation in Yugoslavia following the monarch's death.
Th e essential sources used in the present article are Serbian 2 and Polish 3 press reports published shortly aft er the assassination, as well as the relatively rare studies regarding the event -the recollections of Polish consular offi cer Jan Meysztowicz in particular.
Th e results of the research were verifi ed and subjected to analysis based on the fi ndings of contemporary, usually local specialists in this matter, all of whom are referenced in the bibliography. In the absence of such sources -a quite common occurrence in this case -the author verifi ed his fi ndings by comparing them with archival documents, and by assessing the credibility of the newspapers cited. Th e translations provided in the present article are the author's own.
Course of events
Th e offi cial objective of Alexander I's three-day visit to France was to strengthen the relations between the Little Entente and France. 4 Polish consular offi cer in Marseilles Jan Meysztowicz, 5 who happened to be a witness to the event, also drew attention to the Italian context of the visit, arguing that it was the French side that sought to ease the tense relations between Yugoslavia and Italy. In fact, the government of Gaston Doumergue hoped to gain Mussolini's favour in the view of a future cooperation in the international scene. 6 Alexander I's visit was commented likewise in the Polish press. Dziennik Poznański remarked that France had assumed a mediating role between Yugoslavia and Italy. Th e talks between the two countries appeared promising, given Mussolini's declaration of willingness to fi nd compromise with the Yugoslav monarch. Either way, it was not Il Duce who sought to repair the Italian-Yugoslav relations; at least not as much as the French did. Th e following statement by infl uential senator Henry Bérenger clearly refl ected the moods of the French political class in this subject: "Time has come to seize the opportunity to reach an agreement between Italy, Yugoslavia and France, thus giving a common ground to protect peace. Th e restoration of this agreement must be based on a shared and mutual respect of the honour and rights of each party. Serbia and Italy have fought alongside on French soil, and France has struggled as well for the freedom of these nations. Th e outcome is far too valuable for us to allow it to become obscured and sterilised by some rivalry of prestige and infl uence". Th e Kraków-based newspaper reported that President Lebrun would await the monarch at a train station in Paris. When defi ning the purpose of the visit, the article quoted the words of French Foreign Minister, Louis Barthou, who ensured that "the whole of France would welcome King Alexander enthusiastically as a national hero, as the French were aware of the strength and importance of their friendship with Yugoslavia -a friendship forged in the heat of the struggle for the existence of both nations. France and Yugoslavia were animated by one and the same desire to maintain long-lasting peace and sincere, loyal cooperation".
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Alexander I arrived in France around 4 pm, on board of the destroyer Dubrovnik. Th e anchor was dropped at a short distance from the shore. Several motorboats then approached the ship. Th e monarch boarded one of the boats, followed by French offi cers and the royal entourage, including Yugoslav Foreign Minister, Bogoljub Jevtić. Th e party then left in the direction of Marseilles' Old Port. 10 At the very same time, Queen Maria, wife of Alexander I, was travelling to France by train.
11 She was to await her husband in Dijon, a town on the route from Marseilles to Paris.
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As the Yugoslav king disembarked the motorboat, Meysztowicz drew attention to his magnifi cent admiral's uniform, decorated with a Grand Cordon of the Legion of Honour.
13 Alexander I was greeted at the Quai des Belges by a ceremonial delegation, headed by Foreign Minister Louis Barthou as representative of the French Government, and General Alphonse Joseph Georges, representing here the French Army. As he watched the ceremony, Meysztowicz expressed a certain disgust with the disadvantageously looking military band and honour guard of the French infantry, which both played an important role in the welcoming delegation. Th e Polish offi cial pointed out their inadequately maintained uniforms and antiquated weapons. When describing his impressions, Meysztowicz stated somewhat ironically: "Maybe they went […] with recreating the ambience of the great war of which Alexander was, aft er all, a hero on the Serbian front". 14 It turned out, however, that this was the best equipment available in Marseilles at the time.
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Aft er the offi cial welcoming, the Yugoslav ruler and the French delegation mounted the ceremonial Delage car, which began cruising at a slow pace through the streets of Marseilles. Minister Louis Barthou seated himself on the left of 9 Ibid. 10 Meysztowicz, Czas przeszły dokonany, p. 76. 11 Th e Queen suff ered from seasickness, which forced her to get off the Dubrovnik shortly aft er the vessel left the Yugoslav waters. 12 Ж. Петровска, "Атентатот во Марсеј", Македонска нација, http://www.mn.mk/aktuelno/496 (access: 5 March 2014). 13 Meysztowicz, Czas przeszły dokonany, p. 76. 14 Ibid., p. 75. 15 Ibid. the king, while General Alphonse Joseph Georges -in front of him. Th e vehicle was moving at the speed specifi ed in the ceremony protocol, i.e. exactly 8 km/h, driven by chauff eur named Berteleni. 16 Th eir fi rst destination was the monument erected on Boulevard de la Corniche to commemorate the soldiers fallen on the eastern front during the World War, as the monarch himself wished to lay a wreath there. In accordance with the plan, the car drove up Canebière street, heading towards Saint-Ferreol street. Th e politicians were accompanied by a horseback guard of the French gendarmerie called Gardes Mobiles, under the command of Colonel Jules Piollet.
17 Th e car was preceded by a cavalcade of eighteen police offi cers from Marseilles, and followed by two gendarmes on horseback from Gardes Mobiles, and then by vehicles carrying offi cials and the king's entourage.
18 Th e vast crowd, spontaneously cheering in honour of the monarch, was guarded by numerous policemen and one specially designated unit of the French army, the so-called Tirailleurs Sénégalais. Approximately one thousand fi ve hundred offi cers were deployed in total. Th ey were placed every six meters. Meysztowicz pointed out that both the police and soldiers were facing the car, not the crowd. 19 It should therefore be stated that the safety of the king and French delegates was protected in a highly unprofessional manner, even for the security standards of that period.
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Th e very moment of the attack has been described by Meysztowicz in the following words:
A few dozen metres from the Old Port, right by the stock exchange building, a man made his way through the front rows of the crowd gathered on the sidewalk, leapt onto the footstep of the vehicle and, almost touching his victims with the barrel, he emptied a whole magazine of his heavy 10-shot Mauser.
[…] Th e whole scene lasted a couple of seconds. Th e killer's profi ciency in the handling of an automatic pistol was proof of some intense training in this matter. Th e fatally wounded monarch collapsed on the car seat, while General Georges, hit by three bullets, one of which was lodged in his chest, lost consciousness. Minister Barthou, only slightly wounded in the wrist, managed to leave the car on his own. 21 Meysztowicz's account contains some inaccuracies and omissions due to the chaos that occurred. As a matter of fact, the assassin used a semi-automatic Mauser C96 pistol, which he had hidden in a bouquet of fl owers.
23 Th e murderer approached the monarch with the pretended goal of handing him the fl owers, while shouting in French: "Long live the king!". He then fi red ten shots from close range, most of which hit the monarch and the general. 24 According to Ilustrowany Kuryer Codzienny, thirty shots were fi red during the whole incident, meaning around twenty were from police offi cers.
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Th e course of the assassination was also described by Colonel Jules Piollet:
Th e vehicle carrying King Alexander, Minister Barthou and General Georges was right by the building of the stock exchange, when suddenly I noticed a man jump out of the crowd, who then, having shot at the police offi cer who stood in his way, ran past my horse, jumped on the steps of the car and began to shoot […] I spurred my horse, but even though I found myself beside the killer almost immediately, he managed to fi re the fatal shots before I cut him in the head with my sword […] Th e murderer, despite lying wounded on the ground, did not stop shooting. Th e bullets hit two more police offi cers and several other people in the crowd […] . 26 Th e assault took place around 4.20 pm, about ten minutes before the planned laying of the wreath at the monument on Boulevard de la Corniche. Th e monarch suff ered gunshot wounds to the left hand, left arm and right shoulder. Th e fatal bullet pierced the kings' body on the right side of the chest and reached the liver. Alexander I, bleeding from the mouth and dying in the rear seat of the car, kept his eyes open until his very last breath. 27 Due to the chaos that ensued, 22 he was brought to the nearest police station rather than the hospital. Th e rescue operation was led by Dr. Cammenar. 28 Th e monarch had lost all vital functions around 5.05 pm, three quarters of an hour aft er the attack. 29 However, his body was already in a moribund state shortly aft er receiving the fatal shot. According to the minister Bogoljub Jevtić, the last words whispered by the king were: "Protect me Yugoslavia", but that could have also been "Protect Yugoslavia".
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Also interesting was the description of the fi rst moments aft er the monarch's passing, when his body was lying at the police station. Th e following account was published by Ilustrowana Republika, based on French sources:
As soon as the doctors pronounced the king dead, his corpse was laid on a couch and covered with a tri-colour banner. Th e king's hands are folded on his chest. His face is calm, but completely devoid of blood. All electric lights have been turned off , leaving only two lighted candles. A guard of honour is standing on both sides. Th e carpet before the corpse is covered with fl owers. Th e sobs of the old royal butler can be heard from next door. Th is man dedicated his life to the education of the young prince Alexander and 28 First name unknown. 29 L'Assassinat du roi Alexandre, p. 3. 30 Th e translation from Serbian does not settle the doubt in this matter, while other sources quote the two versions alternately. Whatever they were, these words refl ected the sincere love of King Alexander I for Yugoslavia. See: Петровска, Атентатот во Марсеј.
suff ered his fate with him during the Great War. In the neighbouring room are Serbian journalists who had been greeting the king enthusiastically just one hour prior. Everyone has tears in their eyes.
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Th e chauff eur, Berteleni, was killed on the spot, while Minister Louis Barthou died around 5.40 pm on the operating table of a public hospital in Marseilles. At fi rst, it was speculated that the French diplomat could have died from a bullet shot by a policeman, but it was soon found beyond any reasonable doubt that the minister had died from a ricochet of a bullet aimed at the monarch. Th e head of French diplomacy succumbed to an excessive blood loss caused by the negligence of the rescue personnel who ignored his wounds. Barthou had to stop some car himself in order to be taken to said hospital.
32 Th e diplomat's operation was dramatic; his left hand was amputated, which led to a massive haemorrhage. Despite the eff orts of doctors, Barthou died, even though he had not lost consciousness during the amputation, constantly inquiring about the health of King Alexander I. His condition worsened dramatically with the haemorrhage. Barthou then uttered his last words: "I'm in pain", aft er which he lost consciousness and passed. 33 On the other hand, the gravely wounded General Georges survived the attack. According to Ilustrowana Republika, the general's life was spared by the order pinned to his uniform right above his heart. From the many awards that General Georges could boast about, that day he chose to wear the Serbian Order of St. Sava, made with a material so strong that it changed the trajectory of the bullet. 34 It was General Georges, along with the chauff eur Berteleni, who tried to prevent the murder by getting into a scuffl e with the killer. Th e resulting confusion led to the death of at least six people from the bullets of French police offi cers; the victims were identifi ed as MM. Armellin, Dupré, Durbec and Faris, as well as Mme Dumazert and her son. 35 At least one police offi cer also died in the incident.
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Th e fi rst onlooker to throw himself in pursuit of the assassin was a man named Pelicier. It was him who knocked the bewildered assassin to the ground and started punching him. However, the Marseilles police offi cers responded by battering Pelicier, assuming that he was an accomplice of the killer, to then escort him in handcuff s for interrogation, during which he was subjected to torture. A few days later it became clear that Pelicier had no connection with the murderer of the king. Aft er his release, the unlucky hero was immediately taken to the hospital 31 Ibid. due to his serious condition. Th e Marseilles police force, the same one that beat and tortured Pelicier, then expressed gratitude to the brave citizen for his courageous behaviour. What they forgot about, on the other hand, was an apology. 37 
Identity of the killer
Th e perpetrator of the attack was Vlado Chernozemski, a Bulgarian contract killer, prison recidivist and a regular member of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (IMRO). At the beginning of the 1930s, Chernozemski also undertook active cooperation with Croatian revolutionary terrorists, the Ustaše, acting as an instructor for assassins at their training camp in Janka Puszta, Hungary.
38 Contrary to Meysztowicz's report, the assassin did not die at the scene. Having just fi red his shots, he was hit by Colonel Piollet with a sabre, shot by one of the police offi cers and pummelled by the angry crowd while the police stood and watched. Th e police allowed the mob to bring its own justice, but the badly beaten Chernozemski survived the lynching. Th e killer also attempted to commit suicide by shooting himself in the mouth, but his gun was knocked out of his hand in the resulting chaos.
39
Shortly aft er the attack, the French secret service attempted to interrogate Chernozemski; however, he was unable to utter a single word, as his face had been disfi gured to such an extent that the subsequent identifi cation of the corpse was based on the tattoo symbolising his commitment to the IMRO -a skull and bones with the initials of the organisation. 40 Chernozemski died around 8 pm that day. 41 According to Žaklina Petrovska, the French police offi cers resorted to extremely brutal methods of torture during the interrogation at the security offi ce, which accelerated the already semi-conscious killer's demise. 42 Chernozemski's condition was confi rmed by an account of a correspondent from Vienna quoted in Ilustrowany Kuryer Codzienny: "His face is completely crushed, to the extent that it cannot be identifi ed". 43 Th e body search revealed that, in addition to the aforementioned weapon, Chernozemski carried another Walther pistol, two bombs, a compass and 1,700 French francs. It was determined that the killer had been staying in France since 29 September 1934; fi rst in Paris, and then near Marseilles, about 37 "Marsylczyk, który rzucił się na zabójcę", Ilustrowana Republika, 282 (13 October 1934), p. 30 km from the city. On that fateful day, the assassin had drunk a large amount of alcohol. 44 Chernozemski, who was also known under his real name Velichko Dimitrov Kerin and the pseudonym Vlado the Chauff eur, arrived in Marseilles, using a false passport issued by the Czechoslovak consulate in Zagreb in the false name Peter Kelemen.
45 Th e assassination was initially attributed to this moniker, but the reporters of Politika have then found out and announced on 11 October 1934 that no person of that name currently existed. 46 Th e head of the Czechoslovak consulate in Zagreb asserted that his offi ce had never issued a passport in the name Kelemen. He did, however, off er his assistance in resolving any formal issues. 47 It soon became apparent that the passport number corresponds to the document issued to a former Foreign Legion soldier, Anton Vavrina. Th e legal owner of the passport had journeyed in Yugoslavia shortly before the events in Marseilles and lost the document there. 48 Accordingly, the subsequent mentions of the murderer in Politika still referred to him as Kelemen, but now written in quotation marks. Chernozemski's name, along with a photograph of his face and distinctive chest tattoo, fi rst appeared in that newspaper on 17 October 1934. Th e true identity of the assassin was determined only aft er his exhumation in the presence of his wife, Mrs Karnisheva, a woman of Bulgarian origin suspected of committing several murders in the Balkans. 45 Th e profession stated in the assassin's passport was "merchant", Tajemnica spisku na króla Aleksandra, p. 
First hours after the attack
Th e atmosphere in Marseilles on the night from 9 to 10 October 1934 was depressing. Th e local residents protested shouting: "Marseilles est déshonorée!". 50 Th ey demanded a quick investigation of the assassination and chanted anti-government slogans. Th e local newspapers also blared against the French government. Doumergue's cabinet was partly blamed for the death of Yugoslav monarch. Th e main argument raised in this matter pertained to the current French asylum laws for immigrants. Th e press called for the abolition of this law or, at least, for a tighter control of foreigners entering France.
51 Th e same newspapers also urged the city authorities to erect a statue of the king, as a symbol of French-Yugoslav friendship.
52 Th e fi nancial resources for the execution of this idea were collected by eminent French Marshal Louis Franchet d'Esperey.
53 Similar voices were raised by the people and the press in Paris, where the criticisms were specifi cally directed at the Minister of Interior, Albert Sarraut.
54 Th e politician resigned on 14 October 1934. On the same day, the Minister of Justice, Henry Cheron, was dismissed, under strong pressure exerted by the Minister of War, Marshal Philippe Pétain. 55 According to press reports, the eff ects of the attack in Marseilles had a disastrous infl uence of the health of former President of France, Raymond Poincaré, who passed away on 15 October 1934, at the age of 74. His death was attributed directly to the murder of the Yugoslav monarch. Ilustrowana Republika quoted a statement by some unknown person from the former president's closest entourage: "Th e events in Marseilles, and the tragic deaths of King Alexander and Minister Barthou in particular, deeply aff ected Raymond Poincaré. His health, which had not been raising any concerns until recently, suddenly deteriorated […]". 56 Dziennik Poznański, in turn, would abstain from associating the politician's death with the assassination in Marseilles at fi rst, 57 but soon, this newspaper too published an article asserting that the former president of France was 50 In English: "Marseilles has been dishonoured!". Meysztowicz truly ravaged by the circumstances. 58 All these events soon led to the resignation of the Doumergue's cabinet; his position was assumed on 8 November 1934 by Pierre-Étienne Flandin. 59 Th e transformations in the French government at the turn of October and November 1934 were the least severe punishment that Gaston Doumergue's personnel could have envisioned. As a matter of fact, the above-cited Meysztowicz pointed out, that the Yugoslav embassy in Paris had informed the French national and local authorities some time earlier about the risk of an assassination attempt, but these warnings have been disregarded. 60 Such rumours circulated even among the offi cers of the guard of honour that hosted the monarch in Marseilles. Indeed, one of the offi cers obtained the following warning from his colleague, a member of the Croatian emigrant circles: "An attempt to assassinate King Alexander is to take place in Paris, with the use of a manual machine-gun. Th ere will be many dead. I urge you to avoid being near the king". 61 It should be stressed, however, that these reports about the possibility of an attempt on the Yugoslav monarch's life were merely speculations that would be hard to prove or verify today.
Shortly before the events in Marseilles, Queen Maria urged her husband not to go to France. Th e conversation of the royal couple was overheard by one of the King's servants, who referred it in the following terms: "Queen Maria […] had a bad feeling, she begged and pleaded her husband, imploring him to forgo his voyage to Paris. Her eff orts amounted, however, to nothing […] as the king replied fi rmly: I cannot abandon this plan, as it is crucial to peace in the Balkans".
62 Th e President of the Yugoslav Parliament, former mayor of Belgrade and Yugoslav minister, Kosta Kumanudi, also attempted to prevent the monarch from going to France, having interrupted his own journey to Istanbul for this purpose. Kumanudi's behaviour was odd. In his conversation with the king, he referred to a disturbing premonition regarding the monarch's trip to France. Th e king ignored the warning, and the subject of "Kumanudi's premonitions" was no longer pursued by the Yugoslav press. 63 It is nonetheless possible that, during his journey, Kumanudi had encountered rumours about the possibility of an attack that were spread by Croatian émigrés.
It is worth noting that part of the blame for the success of the attack lies with the police and other services that were supposed to provide safety during the royal visit. According to Głos Poranny, in addition to the above-mentioned issues, such as the ill-advised placement of the offi cers along the king's route and the disregard for the rumours about a possible attempt at his life, it was also revealed that no police patrol had been grouped on the square near the stock exchange, right next to the spot where the assassination took place. 64 Aware of their incompetence, the local police force proceeded with confi scating and censoring the fi lm that clearly proved their shortcomings in securing the visit of the Yugoslav monarch. 65 Another questionable circumstance was the mysterious death of the author of the fi lm, Georges Mejat, which occurred six days aft er the assassination. 66 It is possible that Mejat had been protesting against the confi scation and censorship of the fi lm, to which the police responded by commissioning his murder; this issue, however, remains exclusively in the realm of speculation, given that an offi cial medical certifi cate was issued, stating that Mejat had passed of natural causes. Th e Marseilles Police Department attempted to diminish their responsibility in the eyes of the public by assuring that they had only fi red in the direction of the perpetrators, and that the accidental victims of the shooting were casualties of the assassin's accomplices, with whom he had surrounded himself during the attack. 68 Th is explanation was, however, refuted by a forensic examination of the bullets found at the scene that fi t either the murderer's weapon, or those belonging to the discredited police offi cers. 69 Ilustrowany Kuryer Codzienny tried to defend the police force by stating: "Every crowd is a jungle that cannot be penetrated by even the sharpest offi cer's eye"; 70 such attempts were nonetheless rare. Th e French press even experienced a wave of criticism denouncing their police forces as infested with troublemakers, gangsters and bribe-takers. Th ey were also chastised for their glaring negligence during King Alexander I's visit to Marseilles. Th e rhetorical question of why the Yugoslav monarch had not been accompanied by a squadron of cavalry, as is usual with this type of occasions, was posed. 71 In these circumstances, one could not really expect Gaston Domergue's cabinet to remain in power.
Black birds over King Alexander's coffi n
Th e monarch's corpse was placed on board of the Dubrovnik the next day following the attack. Th e farewell to Alexander I was marked by a gloomy atmosphere. General Souchez 72 paid his last respects in the company of seven offi cers at the police station where the king's corpse had been laid. Th en, on the aft ernoon of 10 November 1934, the funeral procession walked down Canebière street, headed by French President Albert Lebrun, Queen Maria 73 and other members of the Karađorđević family, as well as French ministers and representatives of the French army.
74 Th e procession was accompanied by the sounds of the anthems of France and Yugoslavia. Meysztowicz described the grieving population of Marseilles, which fl ocked to pay their respects, in the following words:
[…] when the coffi n draped in the Yugoslav fl ag touched the deck of the Dubrovnik, the noise of a huge eight-ton bell, traditionally heard only in exceptional circumstances, resonated from the peak of the Notre-Dame de la Garde cathedral erected on a hill overlooking the city from the eastern side of the Old Port, and thousands of heads turned to the almost 10-metre-tall gilded statue of the Madonna gleaming in the sun at the top of the tower, as if in silent reproach for not having protected Marseilles from this ignominious responsibility for the murder of King Alexander, even though its sons weren't culpable themselves. Aft er the identifi cation of the corpse by Prince Arsen and Yugoslav generals, a tribute was paid to the monarch. Th e coffi n carrying his body was placed on the waterfront, and then, following the playing Yugoslav anthem and a memorial prayer, the procession marched towards the Split railway station. 79 From there, the coffi n was transported by train; fi rst to Zagreb, where the monarch was bid farewell by approximately two hundred thousand Croats, and then, on 15 October 1934, to Belgrade. 80 On that day, the coffi n with the body of the monarch was put on public display at the reception hall of the royal palace. Th e people would pray and express their condolences from 6 am to 10 pm for three consecutive days. 81 Many Yugoslav citizens would fulfi l this symbolic duty; countless memorial pilgrimages from all over the country were coming to Belgrade. Th e despair over the loss of the country's ruler was particularly evident among the Serbs. Demonstrations in honour of the monarch, where the participants would manifest their despair and curse the assassins aloud, were a common sight in the streets of the capital. 83 Apart from Belgrade, numerous similar events took place in Ljubljana, Sarajevo, Skopje and Zagreb, where a variety of insults was thrown at Italy and Hungary. Many riots occurred, leading to several international incidents, such as the Italian consul getting roughed up in Ljubljana, or the attack on the Czechoslovak consulate in Zagreb; several Italians living permanently in Croatia and Slovenia were severely beaten. 84 Jewish shops were also targeted in all these cities (and Osijek as well); the Jewish minority had no apparent role in the context of the assassination, nor in the Yugoslav political disputes in general, but with the anti-Semitic propaganda being common everywhere in Europe at the time, the Jews had become a convenient opportunity to vent any negative emotions. 85 Besides, a somewhat absurd situation occurred in Ljubljana and Sarajevo, where the protesters were loudly cursing the Croats, several of whom have even been assaulted, while at the same time in Zagreb, the Croats too were calling for the murderers of King Alexander to be found and tried. 86 Th e funeral of the monarch took place on 18 October 1934 in Belgrade and Topola. Th e offi cial ceremony started at 8 am in the capital of Yugoslavia, with a memorial service celebrated by the Patriarch of the Serbian Orthodox Church, Varnava I. Memorial services also began simultaneously in all other cities of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, usually lasting until the end of the main ceremonies in Belgrade and Topola. Around 9 am, the funeral procession set out from the cathedral in Belgrade bound for the railway station, from where the coffi n would be transported to Topola.
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A large cross was carried at the head of the funeral procession, followed by a cavalry unit and fl ags of all Yugoslav regiments. Behind those walked troops of the Yugoslav and foreign armies, followed by the master of ceremonies Varnava 83 "Нема речи којима би це могао описати бол народа", Политика, 9487 (15 October 1934), p. 8. 84 As a result, the Italian consul in Ljubljana left the country. surrounded by chevaliers of the Order of Karađorđe's Star and clergymen, patriarchs and bishops of other denominations. Th e presence of one more participant was particularly moving: the monarch's favourite horse led by two royal guards. Behind the stallion, the supreme commanders of the Yugoslav Army were carrying the royal insignia. Next were about thirty slowly rolling cars carrying wreaths from the people and offi cials, fi nally followed by the modest coffi n with the remains of the king, drawn by a team of four horses. Behind the coffi n walked the monarch's son, Peter, wearing a Yugoslav Falcon outfi t, his mother, Queen Maria, and all members of the Karađorđević family, followed by delegates of foreign states, and then -masses of Yugoslav citizens.
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Th e subsequent part of the funeral ceremony began at 1 pm in Topola. As the funeral procession was moving by train towards the king's beloved town, dramatic scenes were playing along the route. Th e people that had gathered there fell to their knees as the convoy was passing, holding lighted candles and lamenting. Th e provincial town of Topola was so crowded, that the number of spectators was several times higher than the local population. Th e funeral ended at 1.45 pm, when the coffi n with the body of the monarch was laid in the St. George mausoleum atop the Oplenac mountain. 89 88 Ibid. 89 Ibid. King Alexander I was therefore entombed in the same place as his father, grandfather, great-grandfather and many other ancestors. His coffi n has been placed between the coffi ns of King Peter I and Prince Alexander. Th e monarch was buried in the mausoleum as the Knight-King Alexander I the Unifi er. Th is honour was conferred to him posthumously on 11 October 1934 by act of the parliament. 90 A yearlong period of national mourning in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was announced, which was to end on 9 October 1935. 91 One subject, however, was long kept secret from the Yugoslav public, namely the king's tattoo: a large, single-headed eagle with outstretched wings, whose head was adorned with a crown. Th e tattoo occupied a large part of Alexader's chest. Its meaning stemmed from Prussian heraldry. 92 All the stages of the main funeral ceremony were attended by approximately half a million people, among whom were leaders of the Yugoslav opposition.
93 Shortly aft er the attack in Marseilles, the leader of the Slovenian opposition, Anton Korošec, stated: "At a time when the entire Yugoslav nation mourns the death of its great king, everything should be forgotten. We have to live and work for Yugoslavia".
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His words were a reference to his internment in May 1932, a decision which Korošec considered a direct initiative of King Alexander I. However, in the face of the latter's death, all confl icts have been forgotten. An imminent amnesty for other opposition politicians was also expected. It is also worth noting that the domestic opposition circles had distanced themselves from the activities of Yugoslav émigrés.
Th e king's funeral was also attended by many leading political fi gures. Polish envoy in Belgrade, Władysław Günther-Schwarzburg. 96 It should be mentioned that the Polish civil and military authorities expressed great concern regarding the incident in Marseilles. Th e Polish foreign minister Józef Beck, who, on the day of the attack, was partaking in a hunt at Chodzież as guest of President Mościcki, has returned to Warsaw by plane immediately upon hearing the news of the assassination, in order to transmit condolences to the Yugoslav envoy Branko Lazarević. Th e very next day, the head of Polish diplomacy also expressed his sympathy at the French Embassy at the hands of the Ambassador Jules Laroche. Th e same symbolic gesture was performed by the head of cabinet at the Ministry of War, Lieutenant Colonel Adam Korwin-Sokołowski on behalf of Marshal Józef Piłsudski, and by Prime Minister Leon Kozłowski on behalf of the Polish Government. Both the Yugoslav mission and the French Embassy issued books of condolences, where members of the government, high-rank offi cers, senators, deputies and representatives of local authorities could pay their respects. 97 An offi cial letter of condolences was also sent to Belgrade by the Archbishop of Warsaw and Metropolitan of All Poland of the Polish Orthodox Church, Dionizy.
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Shortly aft er the funeral, in an interview for the Italian newspaper La Stampa, General Bolesław Wieniawa-Długoszowski stated as follows: "Th e terrible news of the death of the king evoked an indescribable feeling throughout the country, especially among the military; it felt like a thunderbolt. I am telling you this as if you were not a journalist, but one my fellow offi cers. Th e great regard that we had for King Alexander, as a living symbol of heroism, will remain deeply engraved in our hearts. We, Poles, understand like few others how great of a loss this is for Yugoslavia, as we understand how crucial for a nation is its leader".
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Numerous public ceremonies were also held throughout Poland to commemorate King Alexander I as a war hero and champion of international peace.
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Who ruled Yugoslavia after the death of King Alexander I?
Following the king's demise, his eldest son, 11-year-old Peter, formally assumed power. Th is was confi rmed by a proclamation of the government of Prime Minister Nikola Uzunović, issued on 10 October 1934, which stated as follows: "On the 9th day of October, at 4 pm, our great king Alexander the First fell victim to a heinous attack in Marseilles. Th e martyr-king's own blood sealed the great work of peace, for which he had undertaken his journey to allied France. According to the art. 36 of our Constitution, the eldest son of the king, His Majesty Peter the Second, now sits on the throne of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Th e government, the royal army and the navy have all sworn their allegiance to His Majesty Peter the Second […]". 101 Th en, on 11 October 1934, on the basis of an act adopted during an extraordinary session of parliament, Peter Karađorđević was offi cially and legally proclaimed King of Yugoslavia. 102 On the day of the assassination, Prince Peter was in Wiltshire, about 130 km from London. Th e boy had just begun his education at the Sandroyd Preparatory School one month earlier, with a view to ascend one day the Yugoslav throne. 103 However, he was granted this honour much earlier than he could have anticipated. On that fateful day, Prince Peter was cheerful and took active part in a school football game. 104 He learned of his father's death the following morning. Th e unpleasant duty of informing the young prince about the tragedy was carried out by the Yugoslav envoy in London named Đurić, 105 who also immediately announced that Peter would be taking over the Yugoslavian throne. 106 Th e reaction of the prince has been described in Dziennik Poznański as follows:
"Th e young monarch showed exceptional composure; quietly sobbing, pale, he left accompanied by the Yugoslav deputy […] to the car, where an inspector of the Scotland Yard was already seated next to the chauff eur". 107 Peter's grandmother, Queen Marie of Yugoslavia, who was staying in London at the time, left England with him by train bound for France. Besides the Scotland Yard, they were also accompanied by French police offi cers. 108 Th e mayor of Belgrade, Milutin Petrović, made a special appeal to his citizens, urging them to forget about the death of King Alexander I for a brief moment, so that his successor could be welcomed with dignity; and, as a matter of fact, the prince was greeted passionately by the residents of the capital as soon as he set foot in Yugoslavia. 109 Peter II then received an oath of allegiance from Alexander I's cousin, Prince-Regent Paul, senator and Minister of Education Radenko Stanković, and the head of the Sava banovina, Ivo Perović. Prince-Regent Paul assumed de facto authority in the country in order to govern until King Peter II came of age. Głos Poranny defi ned Paul Karađorđević as a seasoned diplomat and polyglot, akin to hunting, golf, aviation and cars, as well as a person hitherto uninvolved in politics. As he came to power, it was commonly believed that he would grant amnesty to opposition politicians and exclude military offi cers from key government posts, given the Prince-Regent's conviction that the military should not interfere in politics.
111 Stanković and Petrović for their part would take care of the deceased monarch' estate, as well as his family's current aff airs, with special emphasis on the education of his sons. King Alexander's will, which he had drawn up ten months before his murder, i.e. on 5 January 1934, has therefore been fulfi lled.
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Głos Poranny pointed out that merely one month before the assassination, on 6 September 1934, the eldest son of King Alexander I had been celebrating his eleventh birthday. Th e young prince has always been a resolute child, fascinated by geography and engineering. For King Alexander I's 45 th birthday, he actually built an electric bell by himself as a gift . Głos Poranny also stressed Queen Maria's strong connection with her three sons, for whom she cared -to quote the article -"[…] as an ordinary mortal would". 113 Th e queen paid great attention to the upbringing and education of her children. Th e same newspaper quoted the words that she spoke to Peter during one of his lessons: "Serious tasks await you in life, and if you do not understand something by yourself, you will lack the power to impose them to others". 114 Aft er the attack in Marseilles, these words suddenly gained a real, yet unexpected dimension.
Search for the instigators
Even before the king's body was brought to Belgrade, the Yugoslav authorities had launched an investigation in order to identify Chernozemski's accomplices. It soon became apparent that the direct organisers of the attack were the Ustaše Ante Pavelić and Eugen Dido Kvaternik. Th e attack was carried out in consultation with the leader of the Macedonian revolutionaries, Ivan Mihailov. Near the end of August 1934, a meeting between Pavelić and Mihailov took place at the Hotel Continentale in Rome, during which various alternatives for the assassination of the monarch were discussed. Th en, in September 1934, the two men met again in Munich, where they established their fi nal plan in detail, including the decision regarding the transfer of a large sum of money to the perpetrators.
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In addition to Chernozemski, three more common criminals affi liated with the Croatian Ustaše were designated to carry out the assassination: Mijo Kralj, Ivan Rajić and Zvonimir Pospišil. Th e group obtained French passports from Hungarian intelligence services. At the beginning of October 1934, Kvaternik was included in the direct execution of the attack in Marseilles, providing the perpetrators with money, weapons and ammunition, and acquainting them with the planned route of the monarch. 116 Kvaternik, who was using the false name Kramer, then told the assassins: "You know what you have to do. Th e king is coming to Marseilles today. Shoot him". 117 Pospišil expressed some doubt about the organisation of the attack, for fear of injuring or killing innocent people by accident. Kvaternik reacted nervously to his remarks and excluded Pospišil from the plan. 118 Most of the information about the organisation and the circumstances of the attack were obtained by the French intelligence services following a quick capture of Kralj, Rajić and Pospišil.
119 Th e Ustaše used several false passports, 120 but, aft er being subjected to brutal interrogation, the three men soon broke down and began to disclose important information and testify against the organisers of the assassination. 121 Th e criminals admitted that, in the event of a failure in Marseilles, they were obliged to renew their attempts in other parts of France or in Switzerland, where, according to their knowledge, the monarch meant to go next. 122 Had Chernozemski missed his chance in Marseilles, Kralj was supposed to fi re more shots from the crowd. However, the man eventually panicked, choosing to leave the city in haste instead. 123 A search of the rooms used by the assailants in diff erent parts of France resulted in the fi nding of two bombs and three automatic pistols, as well as numerous Croatian separatist leafl ets and literature. 124 Th e testimony of Chernozemski's accomplices in France led to a broad wave of arrests among Balkan émigrés, including Svetozar Pribićević, 125 a once prominent Yugoslav politician, who was incriminated by Kralj's testimony. On the day of the attack, Kralj had told the receptionist in Aix-en-Provence that he was going to meet with Pribićević.
126 Th e house of the former Yugoslav minister of interior was found to contain a large amount of literature calling for the division of Yugoslavia. All individuals that Pribićević had made contact with were also interrogated. 127 Numerous witnesses showed up at the police stations in Marseilles,
Paris and other French cities to report, with great zeal, any sightings of suspicious foreigners in their vicinity. 128 An extensive search party by the French police led to the capture of indirect participants in the assassination of King Alexander I, such as Kvaternik's wife, Marija Vondrać ("Beautiful Marija"), as well as the fraudster Mio Bzik. Both performed organisational and intelligence duties in Marseilles. 129 Ten days aft er the attack, i.e. on 19 October 1934, Pavelić and Kvaternik were arrested in Turin, where they were hiding. Both explicitly denied any involvement in the assassination. 130 Pavelić maintained that he had never been to Marseilles, although the passport issued in Hungary that was found in his possessions indicated otherwise. 131 Kvaternik too asserted that he disregarded all allegations, having spent the previous ten months in Berlin, and claimed that he could provide proof. 132 Th e French authorities reacted in a manner most baffl ing, choosing not to submit a request for extradition to Mussolini. 133 Such a request was fi led, on the other hand, by Yugoslavia, but Il Duce refused to give out Pavelić and Kvaternik to the Yugoslav judiciary. 134 Th e Italian dictator responded by stating that he had already displayed a maximum of loyalty to Yugoslavia by ordering his police to arrest Pavelić and Kvaternik in the fi rst place, even though he could have confi ned himself to requesting their supervision. 135 Uzunović's government expressed their disappointment with the French authorities, as they had an opportunity to intercept the organisers of the attack from under Italian protection. From this moment, the relations between France and Yugoslavia began to deteriorate gradually. Gazeta Lwowska noted that by end October 1934, many Yugoslav members of the leading organisation for FrenchYugoslav friendship had resigned en masse, even leading to the closure of its branch in Skopje. 136 In early November 1934, Božidar Maksimović, personally an advocate of friendship between Yugoslavia and France, had lost the position of Minister of Justice. 137 Simultaneously, the relations between France and the Little Entente soured as well, a consequence correctly predicted by Ilustrowana Republika already on 11 October 1934. 138 As for Pavelić and Kvaternik, they remained in Italy, where they would await their trial, set for 29 March 1936, in relatively comfortable conditions. In contrast, Kralj, Rajić and Pospišil were all held in remand and eventually sentenced to life imprisonment following a high-profi le trial, which took place on 12 February 1936 in Aix-en-Provence, where the assassins had been hiding on the day before the assassination. Th e prosecution demanded the death penalty for the accomplices of the killer; such voices were also raised by the French and Yugoslav public opinion. Th e trial, however, raised a lot of controversy. In Yugoslavia, it was generally believed that Mussolini himself had taken the killer's accomplices under his protection, thus saving them from a death sentence. 139 Pospišil eventually died in mysterious circumstances at the Caen prison in 1940; the same fate was met one year later by Kralj in Fontevraud. Only Rajić has been released from prison, on 12 December 1941, due to his deteriorating health. He then returned to Croatia, where he died in 1944. 140 Th e role of Ivan Mihailov, on the other hand, became marginal over the course of the investigation. Th is was due to the decreasing importance of the Macedonian revolutionary organisation, giving way to that of the Ustaše. Mihailov's persona aroused, however, interest among the press. For instance, Ilustrowana Republika claimed, in an article from 11 October 1934, that King Alexander I may have been murdered out of vengeance by Macedonian revolutionaries. Th e Yugoslav monarch had indeed reached an agreement in May 1934 with Bulgarian Prime Minister, Kimon Georgiev, regarding the removal of IMRO cells from Bulgarian territory. 141 Ilustrowana Republika also cited an interview with Mihailov, that had taken place in Istanbul some time before the attack in Marseilles. During the conversation, the IMRO leader called himself an idealist and a nationalist, whose only goal was the establishment of an independent Macedonia. A blunt remark by the Greek journalist prompted him to reply in all seriousness that the Macedonian revolutionaries belonged to their organisation for ideological motives and did not receive any money for their activities, nor did said activities entail killing people. 142 dying in a bed is demeaning".
143 Th e leader of the Macedonian revolutionaries was seen at the turn of September and October 1934 in Switzerland, but his participation in the assassination of Alexander I was being taken into consideration only in Yugoslavia. 144 It is diffi cult to determine the role played by representatives of other European countries in the murder of the Yugoslav king. Th e fact that the assassins were trained in a terrorist facility on Hungarian soil is beyond any discussion. Th e journalists from Politika also put forth the bold thesis that the perpetrators had obtained passports from the Hungarian intelligence with the consent of Miklós Horthy, Regent of the Kingdom of Hungary, and Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Gömbös. However, there is little risk in assuming that Mussolini himself supported the idea of murdering the Yugoslav monarch, as evidenced by his protection of Pavelić and Kvaternik, as well as the pressure asserted by him during the trial in Aix-en-Provence.
In October 1934, a strong wave of accusations fell on the Hungarian authorities on the part of Yugoslavia, France and Czechoslovakia. Both the governments and the press of these countries expressed their contempt. Th ey demanded an international investigation on Hungarian territory in order to establish any local ties with the organisers of the attack in Marseilles. In view of these allegations and demands, Gömbös' government reacted nervously, denouncing the accusations as an uncalled slandering campaign and France's attempt to distance itself from moral responsibility for the consequences of the attack, caused by the incompetence of Doumergue's cabinet. Th e Hungarian press pointed out that a much larger Yugoslav diaspora resided in France, and that no anti-Yugoslav activities had been witnessed in Hungary, contrarily to those of Pribićević for instance.
145 Czechoslovakia was also criticised for being allegedly more interested in pursuing its anti-Hungarian policies than in explaining the circumstances of the murder of the king.
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Th e Hungarian line of defence was later altered when Gömbös' cabinet issued an offi cial statement stating that that none of the detained assailants were Hungarian nationals, and that the area of the purported terrorist camp in Janka Puszta had been thoroughly searched and supervised, even though they had been claiming previously that only a regular farm was located there. According to the authorities in Budapest, the governments of Czechoslovakia and France had allegedly inspired a smear campaign, aimed at destabilising Hungary at the expense of a grieving Yugoslavia.
147 Th e stance of Gömbös' cabinet later became somewhat easier to defend with the appearance, in the Czechoslovak press, 143 Ibid. 144 Th e confl ict between Hungary and the Little Entente and France entered a new act with a declaration stating the need for the internationalisation of the investigation regarding the incident in Marseilles, issued on 20 October 1934 by the council of the Little Entente in consultation with the relevant members of the Balkan Entente. In practice, the document was a call for cooperation in order to identify all the organisers and perpetrators of the attack (including the governments that could have inspired it), so that such acts of terror would no longer occur in Europe. Full solidarity with Yugoslavia was also expressed. Th e declaration had undoubtedly an anti-Hungarian character; even though the document did not explicitly mention Hungary, it was easily understandable that this country was the document's true recipient. 149 Meanwhile, Gömbös' government naively reported that it had launched its own investigation on Hungarian territory. Th e Hungarian Prime Minister also announced that he was leaving to pay a visit to the "allied Polish nation", 150 in order to distance himself from the unjust smear campaign directed against his country. Moreover, Gömbös confi rmed in full force: "neither the Hungarian government, nor any offi cial body for that matter; not even one single Hungarian citizen was involved in this murder". 151 Th e Little Entente and the Balkan Entente did not have the instruments nor the pressure force to impose the opening of an international investigation on Hungarian territory.
Conclusion
Th e true instigators of the assassination of King Alexander I were never identifi ed, although evidence suggests that Benito Mussolini was the mastermind of this crime, eff ectively exploiting the hostility of Croatian and Macedonian terrorists against the Karađorđević monarchy. Several years aft er the death of the king, an unexpected warming of Italian-Yugoslav relations occurred along with a gradual increase in infl uence of fascism and Nazism in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Eventually, the tripartite agreements between Belgrade, Rome and Berlin concluded during World War II eff ectively compromised the political eff orts of King Alexander I, and that of Karađorđevićs' Yugoslavia in general.
Th e evaluation of Alexander I should not be unambiguous. He did undeniably suspend democracy in the country and declare himself its only leader. However, his motives went considerably beyond the idealistic and uncritical idea of democracy. At the beginning of January 1929, he attempted to save the unifi ed state from an actual threat of breaking apart due to strong separatist tendencies, occasionally resorting to terrorist methods. His actions were therefore not motivated by the desire to gain or maintain power, which he enjoyed anyway as head of state, but by the need for radical measure in order to save a failing country. Only a leader blessed with the qualities of an outstanding statesman could make the risky decision of suspending basic democratic institutions, while establishing at the same time a regime that could still be perceived as a transitional, remedial response to the crisis. However, the accomplishment of King Alexander I's further objectives was tragically cut short by his shameful assassination in 1934. Aft er his death, the state that he had established with his father and a group of seasoned politicians, came to a crossroads between maintaining internal stability and reconfi guring its position in the international scene. I believe that the Yugoslavia envisioned by the Karađorđevićs never got over the death of its most important guardian, and both the circumstances and consequences of the assassination described in the present article clearly prove that the sole objective of the perpetrators and their instigators was the destruction of the basic institutions of this state.
Abstract
Th e article discusses the circumstances of the assassination of King Alexander I of Yugoslavia in October 1934 in Marseilles, France. Th e results of research served as a basis for the analysis of the course of events related to the assassination of King Alexander I, including the political context of the murder, its direct background and the earliest consequences for both Yugoslavia and the international scene. Within the broad spectrum of research issues involved in the assassination, there are some worthy of special attention, such as the organisation of King Alexander I's visit to France, the characteristics of the assassin, the internal situation in Yugoslavia aft er the monarch's death, the reactions of other governments to the event, and the investigation launched into the attack, followed by the steps taken in order to internationalise it. Th e basic research material for the analysis consisted of Serbian and Polish press articles from the interwar period, which constitute not just a reliable source, but oft en the only source available -yet a truly fascinating one. Moreover, the fi ndings demonstrated in the present article have been verifi ed in relation to the (oft en insuffi cient) Polish and international literature in this subject, as well as the archival materials available at the Yugoslavian Archives in Belgrade. Th e variety of approaches applied made it possible to discuss the circumstances of King Alexander's assassination in great detail, otherwise unavailable in just one single publication. It also reveals the incompetence of the French police of that time and explains, at least in part, the background of the plot to kill the Yugoslav king.
